Already the two interlocutors are talking past each other. Socrates bristles at the tales of gods going to war with each other. He refers to the god of friendship (Zeus Philios), who should reign among the deities. His objections seem directed not so much against tradition itself as against the portrayal of the gods as immoral, unethical, mutually hostile, anarchic. Like Xenophanes the philosophic critic of popular religion, Socrates thinks it is the height of impiety to attribute despicable conduct to the gods (see ch. 9.1-9.2*). His reference to the Greater Panathenaea festival suggests that he does not regard the civic cult itself as beyond reproach.
But he demurs to the invitation of Euthyphro, who would like nothing better than to relate lurid tales of gods behaving badly. There is a definition on the table that needs to be examined. Socrates complains, as often in his discussions, that Euthyphro’s account is too specific. What Socrates is seeking is not just an example (Euthyphro’s taking legal action) but a definition that can cover all cases. What distinguishes holy from unholy actions in general?
“Well then,” Euthyphro replies, “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.”[17]
Socrates commends Euthyphro for giving an appropriately general definition. According to this definition we can distinguish between what is pious or holy and what is not. But, he reminds the seer, according to Euthyphro and the poets, the gods sometimes oppose and contend with each other. What do they disagree about? Surely the same things mortals disagree about, right and wrong, good and bad, in other words, value judgments. Euthyphro agrees. “The same things, according to you,” Socrates asks, “some gods consider just, some unjust, concerning which they contend in disputes and go to war with each other, right?”
“Yes.”
“The same things, then, apparently are both hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be both abhorrent and dear to the gods.”
“Apparently.”
“So the same things, Euthyphro, would be both holy and unholy, by this definition.”[18]
Euthyphro’s definition fails because it does not provide a criterion by which we can determine how to act piously. An action that Zeus loves may be hated by Cronus and Uranus. By appeasing one god we may be offending another. Like Hippolytus, in worshiping Artemis, goddess of chastity, we may alienate Aphrodite, goddess of lust (see ch. 9.1*). Indeed, as long as we view the gods as mutually hostile, any rational approach to them may prove futile. (This objection would not apply to Socrates, who does not accept the notion of conflict among the gods, but Socrates is, as usual, arguing ex homine and ad hominem.)
To help Euthyphro out, Socrates suggests that when disputes arise among mortals, they rarely disagree about moral principles, but tend to disagree about particular facts. For instance, if a man is accused of murder, the accused does not claim that murderers should go unpunished, but he maintains that he did not kill his opponent wrongfully. He might say, for instance, that he killed him in self-defense. Perhaps the gods too, if they disagree, do not do so about what justice is, but about whether a given act is an instance of justice or injustice.[19]
Enlightened by Socrates, Euthyphro now ventures another definition: “I would say that this is the holy: what all the gods love; and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is unholy.”[20] The new definition avoids the problem of the previous one in leaving open the possibility that the same things might be loved by some gods and hated by others. Holy actions are those approved unanimously by the gods.
[17]. Plato Euthyphro 6e-7a, trans. Grube.
[18]. Plato Euthyphro 7e-8a.
[19]. Plato Euthyphro 8b-e.
[20]. Plato Euthyphro 9e.