If piety is what all the gods love and impiety is what all the gods hate, we have removed the potential for conflict in our account of this virtue. (Of course it remains to be seen if there is anything that satisfies the definition; perhaps the gods do not agree on anything.)
But Socrates has a different worry. He asks, “Consider the following: is what is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is loved by the gods?” He seems to want a definition that not only identifies a true feature of the virtue in question, but accounts for it as well. Suppose a certain action is loved by all the gods. Is it pious merely because they love it, or do they love it because it is (independently) pious, because it has some other feature that makes it worthy of love by all the gods? In the former case, the gods are the final arbiter of the virtue; in the latter, there is some source of value that compels the admiration of even the gods. Socrates wants to identify what makes an action holy, not just what may be an incidental characteristic of holy actions. He wants to know the essence or nature of the thing (the ousia, a term that will become increasingly important in philosophical discourse), not just a feature (pathos) of it.[4]
At this point Euthyphro is running out of ideas. He complains that his proposed definitions just seem to go in circles. Here Plato seems to start playing with Euthyphro’s name, which means ‘straight thinker’: his thinking is not as clear as he might wish. Socrates offers a suggestion: are actions that are pious also just? Yes. He helps Euthyphro see that there is an overlap between what is pious and what is just, such that all that is pious seems to be just, but not all that is just is pious. For instance, it would be just for a merchant to give me correct change for a purchase, but it would not necessarily be pious. So what part of justice is piety?
Euthyphro responds that it is the part that has to do with care for the gods. Very good, Socrates replies. We know what it is to take care of animals and humans—we seek to help them and make them better. What then is care for the gods? It is the kind of service slaves give to masters, Euthyphro answers. This sounds promising, but Socrates presses Euthyphro. Slaves can feed their masters and wash their dishes and their clothes and tend their fields. But if the gods are perfect, they don’t need anything from humans. How then can we serve the gods?
Euthyphro says that we offer them sacrifices and do what they wish us to do. But now it appears that he is again saying that piety is doing what is pleasing to the gods, without knowing what it is that pleases them. Euthyphro’s latest definition turns out to be indistinguishable from the previous definition: what is pleasing to all the gods, and his inquiry is going in a circle. What are we to say now?
Euthyphro suddenly remembers a prior engagement and bids Socrates a hasty good-bye. Socrates laments that he has lost the opportunity to find an understanding of piety that he could use to defend himself in court.
[4] Plato Euthyphro 11a.