At this point, Glaucon son of Ariston, enters the discussion with an analysis. Consider, he says, a distinction between an object that is good for its own sake, such as joy or a harmless pleasure; an object that is good both for its own sake and the results that come from it, such as health; and an object that is good not for its own sake but only for its results, such as exercise (!). Which kind of good is justice? Glaucon says he would want justice to be in the class of things that are good in themselves and also for their results; but most people, he supposes, would put it in the last class, as an object that is not good in itself, but only for its results. He promises to give an argument that will prove (I) that most people would consider justice to fall in the third class; (II) that they accordingly practice it grudgingly; and (III) that they have some justification for doing so. He claims that this is not his view, but it is the popular view, which he hopes that Socrates can refute and replace with a more positive view of justice.[8]
Glaucon begins by imagining a kind of state of nature in which there is no rule of law. Everyone would prefer to do injustice to others and to get away with it, so as to exploit others to their own advantage. But alas, they find that they are preyed upon no less than they prey on others, which is the worst situation to be in. As a compromise, they settle on an arrangement in which there is a system of laws that is enforced to keep each person from harming other persons. This is a kind of intermediate position between being able to exploit others and being victimized oneself, a second-best that people reluctantly accept.
To show that people accept justice only grudgingly, Glaucon offers a thought experiment. There is a tale that the ancestor of King Gyges of Lydia in Asia Minor was a shepherd. Taking refuge from a storm in a cave, he found a magical ring that, when rotated, made the wearer invisible. With his ring, he went to see the king. Making himself invisible, he seduced the king’s wife, assassinated the king, and usurped the throne. Now suppose, Glaucon says, that there were two such rings, one possessed by an unjust person, one by a just person. Who would be so honorable as to resist taking advantage of others and doing what Gyges’ forbear did?
Finally, Glaucon offers another thought experiment. Suppose there were a perfectly unjust person who was a master of deception, so that he might do the greatest wrongs while maintaining his reputation for justice. On the other hand, imagine a perfectly just person who is stripped of his reputation for justice. What will be the result?
The unjust person will be promoted and supported and achieve the greatest successes. The just person will be flogged, put on the rack, blinded, and crucified after the Persian manner despite his virtue. Can you show us, Glaucon challenges, that the just person is better off than the unjust person, even in this extremity? In other words, can you show that justice is inherently better than injustice, even in a world in which reputations can be counterfeited and rewards hijacked by unjust persons?[9]
At this point, Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus joins in the discussion. He points out that up until now, no poet or sage has praised justice for its own sake, but always for the rewards that allegedly come from it—as if what was really important was not the virtue, but the non-moral benefits that come from it. What is really valuable, the argument implies, is not justice, but the riches, power, and fame that justice allegedly produces. One might object that the gods will bless just people and punish the unjust. But according to some poets and sages, the gods can be won over by generous sacrifices. And who is better able to offer generous sacrifices than a person who has gained wealth by unjust practices?[10]
According to the present argument, Adeimantus concludes, “Of all of you who claim to be champions of justice, starting from the heroes of old whose tales have been passed down, to the present generation of people, no one has ever blamed injustice nor praised justice except in terms of reputations, honors, and gifts that arise from them. What power each one has in the soul of its possessor, independent of its perception by gods or men, no one has ever properly explained, either in poetry or in prose, namely that injustice is the greatest of evils the soul could possess, while justice is the greatest good.”[11]
As Plato allowed the argument for immortality of soul in the Phaedo to confront ever greater challenges, so in the Republic, the argument against justice is ratcheted up to the highest level. Arguments for justice and against injustice have been built on the sandy foundation of rewards and punishments. But if even the favor of the gods can be bought, what hope is there that a just person can achieve happiness in this life, or even the next? What we need is not another pious but misguided effort to show how virtue pays in terms of non-moral goods. We need to see how justice is valuable in and of itself, independently of its power to provide worldly goods. If the question morality faces is always, “What’s in it for me?” there can be no final victory for virtue over vice. We need to see how virtue is its own reward.
[8] Plato Republic II, 357a-358d.
[9] Plato Republic II, 358e-362c.
[10] Plato Republic II, 362d-366d.
[11] Plato Republic II, 366d-367a.