In the spring of 431 the enemies of Athens struck the first blow when Theban commandos with the help of traitors entered the city of Plataea near the borders of Attica and attempted to take over the city by a coup. The Plataeans put up an unexpected resistance and captured, then killed the commandos before the main body of the Theban army could come to their rescue.[10] Thebes had long been an enemy of Athens, and Plataea an ally of Athens. Soon after this attack, the Spartans led a large army to the borders of Attica. The commander was King Archidamus, who had opposed the declaration of war and was a personal friend of Pericles. He sent a herald to try to establish peace negotiations at the last minute. But the herald was turned away. The army entered Attica in summer, and after pausing to try to bait the Athenians to battle — unsuccessfully — they laid waste the countryside.[11]
The Spartans and their allies wanted nothing more than for the Athenians to march out from behind their walls to oppose the invasion. They were confident of a decisive victory that would put a quick end to the war. But Pericles’ policy was to avoid a land battle. Pericles was now firmly in control of Athenian foreign policy. He had led the forces to recapture Samos in 440;[12] he had pushed for the defensive alliance with Corcyra.[13] Pericles was intent on building Athenian power even if it meant war with Sparta, and even if it meant devastation for the Attic countryside, for he knew that Athens was no match for Sparta on land. He also knew that Sparta was no match for Athens on the sea. As long as Athens controlled the sea, she could strike when and where she wished with sea-borne troops. If Sparta laid waste to Attica by invasion, Athens would lay waste to Laconia by landing raiding parties. With overseas colonies and trade, Athens could import anything she lacked; if her own crops were burned, she could buy foreign produce. When the Spartans invaded Attica, the people from all over the peninsula took refuge in the mother city. They sat safely behind the great walls of Athens while the Spartans destroyed their farmlands. It was painful for the Athenians to watch the destruction of their property, Pericles knew, but he avoided a pitched battle, confident that Athens would emerge from the conflict more powerful than ever.[14] The gains would be worth the sacrifice.
That same spring reinforcements arrived to help the Athenian forces in their siege of Potidaea. Phormio brought ships and 1,600 men to Chalcidice. He landed on the tip of the peninsula of Pallene, and advanced from the south towards Potidaea. The Potidaeans did not oppose him, so he marched up to the city wall and had his men build a counter-wall before it. Now, Potidaea was sealed off from both the north and the south; Athenian troops controlled the land on both sides of the isthmus on which Potidaea was built, and Athenian ships controlled the sea.
Aristeus, the Corinthian general, realized the situation was hopeless. He encouraged the Potidaeans to wait for favorable weather conditions and sail away, leaving only a garrison of five hundred, who could last longer on the few supplies left; he himself volunteered to stay with them. But the Potidaeans refused to abandon their city and they saw Aristeus as more valuable to them when he was on the attack. So Aristeus himself sailed out, probably at night, with the hope of planning a counterattack with his Chalcidicean allies.
Socrates and his fellow soldiers continued to wait and watch from their camp to the north of Potidaea. Phormio used his troops to devastate the countryside of Chalcidice, capturing some towns in the process. Meanwhile Aristeus carried out some ambushes on Athenian troops. But most of the campaign consisted of tedious watches to keep the Potidaeans from sallying out to attack, or to escape the blockade. Endless days standing guard, endless nights standing watch. The same camp food day in, day out. The same men, the same stories, the same weather for weeks on end. The same tents, the same walls, the same scenery, the same mind-numbing routine. But Socrates’ mind was not dulled. Alcibiades tells of an incident that happened one summer in Potidaea:
Then there is this “daring deed of the valiant hero,”[15] which happened once on that campaign, and which you must hear. Socrates started thinking about something around dawn, standing on his feet there, pondering. When he couldn’t figure out the problem, he didn’t give up, but stood there meditating. Around midday the men began to notice, and they pointed out to each other that Socrates had been standing there since dawn, just thinking. Finally in the evening after dinner, some of the Ionians brought out their sleeping bags, partly to sleep in the cool air (it was summer then, you see) and partly to see if Socrates would keep standing there all night. Sure enough, Socrates stood there until the day broke and the sun began to rise. Then he said his prayers to the sun and took off.[16]
It seems the Ionian soldiers were taking bets on Socrates’ mental powers. Those who put their money on a twenty-four hour vigil won. The philosopher had amazing powers of concentration, even achieving a trance-like absorption in a problem. Far from damaging his ability to think and reason, the dull routine of the campaign may have allowed him to turn his attention to abstract matters.
After the summer campaigns the troops and Potidaea again settled in for another long winter.
[10].Thucydides 2.2-6.
[11].Thucydides 2.12, 19-23.
[12.Thucydides 1.116-117.
[13].Plutarch Pericles 29.1 with Kagan 1969:238.
[14].Thucydides 2.14.2, 2.16.2, 2.21-22.
[15].Homer Odyssey 4.242, 271.
[16].Plato Symposium 220c-d.