At this point Socrates has effectively silenced Polus, showing, among other things, that committing injustice is more disgraceful and shameful than having injustice done to you. But Callicles, whom we met at the very beginning of the dialogue, is unimpressed. He asks if Socrates is actually serious. “Don’t be shocked,” Socrates replies, “that I say such things, but stop my beloved Philosophy from saying them. For she is the one, my dear friend, who utters the words you now hear coming from me. … Philosophy always says the same things, and she says what you are now shocked at, and you heard her speeches for yourself. So either refute her and the view I just now defended—that to commit injustice and having committed it to escape justice is the ultimate evil—or, if you leave this view unrefuted, then … Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but he will be out of tune with you for the rest of your life. And as far as I’m concerned, sir, I’d rather have my lyre out of tune, direct a dance out of rhythm, and have the majority of men disagree with and contradict me, than for me alone to be discordant with myself and contradict my own words.”[15]
Here Socrates seems to reveal a key aspect of his method that remains hidden in most of his conversations. The questions he asks, that often lead his interlocutor to contradict himself, Socrates regards as the message of Philosophy herself, here personified. The point is that if an individual does not acknowledge certain important truths, then the contradictions internal to the person’s thinking will emerge, demonstrating that no rational person can hold such views. The falsehoods we carry around will show themselves as conflicting with the truths we inevitably accept.
Callicles accuses Socrates of acting like a demagogue, and then launches into a long harangue of his own. He points out a distinction popular among sophists between and culture or convention (nomos) and nature (physis).[16] By switching contexts a clever speaker can trip up an opponent. For instance, by convention injustice is more shameful than justice; but by nature, that is: by the law of the jungle, the more powerful takes what he wants. Callicles stands by the law of the jungle, and, as the smarter and stronger, wants to rule over others—and not apologize for doing so. With a little prodding from Socrates, he announces that the smarter and stronger person should get a larger share of good things than the duller and weaker. Moreover, he should not control his appetites, but indulge them to the maximum.[17] Callicles goes so far as to say, “Self-indulgence, prodigality, and freedom from restraint … these are virtue and happiness; everything else, the ornaments and agreements of men that run counter to nature, are worthless rubbish.”[18]
This opening gives Socrates the opportunity to compare Callicles’ virtuous person to a leaky pot or even a sieve that passes everything through without retaining anything. Socrates points out that the pleasure of eating or drinking depends on the pain of hunger and thirst; without a correlative pain there would be no pleasure in indulgence. Furthermore, the pleasure in satisfying appetites seems pretty much the same in bad people and good. We need something else to distinguish them. The good human being does good things, and needs to have self-control and a sense of justice to bring them about, as well as a craft. Socrates brings back the Craft Analogy (see ch. 11.3) to point out the need to direct one’s efforts toward some good outcome. “What about justice?” Socrates asks Callias. “Suppose you don’t want to do wrong; is that enough to ensure that you won’t commit evil, or do you need in addition to equip yourself with some method or craft (technē), for fear that if you don’t learn and practice this, you’ll do wrong willy-nilly?”[19]
Socrates insists that the aim of the politician should be not just to win arguments, but to make the citizens of the state as good as possible.[20] He then asks whether Callicles has ever made the citizens of Athens better.[21] Callicles thinks the question is rude and vindictive. Thereupon, Socrates points out that Pericles, the famous statesman, near the end of his life, was convicted by the people of embezzlement, and almost condemned to death—as if he had made the citizens of Athens more hostile rather than more friendly to himself.[22] Socrates goes on to recount the prosecutions of the statesmen Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades. As former leaders of the democracy, should they not have made the citizens more friendly toward themselves? Why did they alienate their own constituencies?
[15].Plato Gorgias 482a-b.
[16].See Heinimann 1945, a classic study. Pohlenz 1953 claims that the emphasis on this topic in ethics derives from Archelaus, Socrates’ teacher.
[17].Plato Gorgias 491c-d; 492d-e.
[18.Plato Gorgias 492c.
[19].Plato Gorgias 509d-e.
[20].E.g., Plato Gorgias 513e.
[21].Plato Gorgias 515a.
[22].Plato Gorgias 515e-516a. See Dodds 1959: 357-358; Irwin 1979: 234.