Socrates asks Clinias if it is good enough just to possess good things, or if we need to use them. For instance, if a carpenter had tools and wood but never used them, would they help him? If an individual had money but never used it, would it help him? No. Then we must not only have good things but know how to use them. We need to know how to use things rightly. Drawing again on the Craft Analogy, Socrates points out that the art of carpentry teaches how to use wood rightly. In general we need knowledge to know how to use our possessions. “So knowledge [epistēmē], it appears, provides not only good luck but also well-doing to people in every possession and action. (He agrees.) Is there then … any profit to be had from any possession without prudence [phronēsis] and wisdom [sophia]?”[6] Here Socrates employs a set of terms that are important for philosophy. He uses them almost interchangeably in the discussion. Later Aristotle will strongly distinguish theoretical knowledge, which includes “science” (epistēmē) and comprehension (sophia), from practical wisdom (phronēsis).[7] But Socrates is not much concerned with fine epistemological distinctions. The only important contrast for him is between understanding and ignorance.
Continuing with the discussion, Socrates points out that it would be better for someone who was ignorant to have fewer possessions and talents because he would do less harm with them. In other words, someone with great talents and resources who is ignorant can do more damage than someone who is incompetent and poor. In our day we may think of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin; it would be better if they had lacked talents and resources, for they would have done less damage. Socrates may have had in mind his friends Alcibiades and Critias. “In summary … it looks like all the goods we named at the outset are not confirmed by our discussion as being inherently good, but rather it’s like this: if ignorance directs them, they are greater evils than their opposites inasmuch as they are subject to an evil master; but if prudence and wisdom direct them, they are greater goods. But by themselves neither kind has any value.”[8] Socrates generalizes: “What then is the outcome of our discussion? Isn’t it this, that of all our alleged advantages, nothing is either good or bad, but only these last two, of which wisdom is good, ignorance evil?” Clinias agrees.[9]
In this discussion Socrates, with his recognition of things that are and are not inherent goods (auta kath’ hauta pephuken agatha), comes close to a modern distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goods. Intrinsic goods are valuable no matter what, whereas instrumental goods are (potentially) good means to ends, but also admit of misuse when the ends are bad. Thus money can buy schools or hospitals on the one hand, or weapons of destruction on the other; food for the needy on the one hand, or addictive drugs on the other. Yet knowledge, by itself, is not quite an intrinsic good: it is valuable insofar as it directs the use of possessions and abilities to the proper end, which needs to be recognized by the wise director. Wisdom never errs, but hits the mark (tunchanein), like an infallible marksman. But then the wise director must know the target he is aiming at. And what is that?
At this point Socrates’ quest for understanding is far from over. But the most powerful implication of the discussion is that the individual (Clinias, in this case) is not at the mercy of circumstances beyond his power in seeking for happiness. What is crucial is not having good luck, a fortunate confluence of events, but having knowledge—a capacity that falls within the individual’s power. Happiness is not what happens to you by chance, but what you do with what you have. The things that people spend their lives coveting or accumulating—wealth, recognition, status, connections, power—are valuationally neutral: they are neither good nor bad. They become good (or bad) only when they are used for the right (or wrong) end. Knowledge is the master power that ensures the proper use of possessions and talents. Without knowledge nothing can profit us; with knowledge any possessions and talent we have will be valuable. We are no longer subject to the wheel of fortune that is the engine of comedy and tragedy. We control our own happiness, and hence our own destiny.
Socrates draws to the end of his sample lesson. “Since we are all eager to be happy, and since we have found that we will become so by using things and using them rightly, and since knowledge is what provides rightness and good luck, every person must, it seems, exert every effort to become as wise as possible, don’t you think?” “Yes.”[10] Socrates points out that if this is so, one should be willing to make any sacrifice to become wise. “At least if wisdom, Clinias, is teachable, and doesn’t come to people by itself.”[11] This raises the question Socrates had put to Protagoras, the question whether there can be genuine teachers of wisdom (chs. 5-6*). Clinias thinks it can be taught, and Socrates congratulates him for coming to this view. Then, he points out, Clinias must seek wisdom (philosophein).
“That,” says Socrates, “is my example, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of the kind of introductory conversation I would like to hear.” The sophists should impart knowledge to their prospective pupil and inspire him with the longing for more understanding, rather than trap him into contradictions to humiliate him. The introductory conversation, protreptikoi logoi, should be an invitation or “exhortation” to philosophize, encouraging the listener to pursue a life of reason. Later the term became a generic title of introductions or invitations to philosophy, the Protrepticus. This brings to an end Socrates’ dialogue-within-a-dialogue, itself an exhortation to conduct discussions in a constructive and edifying rather than a destructive and demoralizing manner. Socrates, we know, conducts discussions which lead to contradictions. But he is gentle in his treatment of young men. And he produces contradictions not for the sake of entertainment but for the sake of instruction and enlightenment.
[6].Plato Euthydemus 280c-281b.
[7].Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 6.3-7.
[8].Plato Euthydemus 281b-e.
[9].Plato Euthydemus 281e.
[10].Plato Euthydemus 282a.
[11].Plato Euthydemus 282c.