Two of the leading military leaders of the Athenian armies were Nicias and Laches. Plato introduces us to them in a dialogue named after the latter. Socrates encounters the two generals with their friends Lysimachus and Melesias, at a time soon after the battle of Delium.[6] Lysimachus and Melesias wish to consult the generals on the education of their sons, Aristides and Thucydides, respectively. The boys are namesakes of illustrious ancestors. Aristides is the grandson of Aristides the Just and Thucydides the great-grandson of Thucydides, who was the leader of the conservative party in the mid-fifth century (not the historian of the same name) (see ch. 2* for both ancestors). And therein lies their fathers’ problem: the boys’ fathers have not lived up to the illustrious reputations of their own father and grandfather. They want to bring up their sons to be worthy of their ancestors.
Having watched a demonstration by an instructor of fighting in armor, the parents ask the generals if this kind of training will make their sons brave. While infantrymen like Socrates have experience fighting in armor, there were no military academies or regular courses of instruction in martial arts in Athens. The citizen soldiers got little formal training. Why not pay some expert to teach their sons? Nicias ticks off the advantages of such training, while Laches remains skeptical of its value. The fathers turn to Socrates to “cast the deciding vote.” But Socrates points out this is not a subject to be decided on the basis of majority vote, but by means of knowledge.[7] First they must decide what their real objective is. And this should be the souls of the young men, how to improve them. Now, one who could improve souls would have an art or craft by which to do so. The only people who claim to make people better are the sophists, but Socrates lacks the money to pay the tuition and so cannot vouch for the sophists and their educational offerings. Laches and Nicias, however, are famous men who must have acquired special knowledge, so the fathers should ask them for help. Lysimachus approves of the procedure and suggests that the generals investigate the problem together with Socrates.
“You obviously don’t know,” replies Nicias, “that anyone who gets close enough to Socrates to converse with him, even if starts talking about something else, must eventually go around and around with Socrates in argument and not stop until the man ends up giving a complete account of how he lives now and how he has spent his past life. And when Socrates has his victim in his grasp, he won’t let the man go until he has squeezed him dry.”[8] Nicias portrays Socrates as a black-belt in verbal martial arts. “As for me, I find nothing unusual or unpleasant in being worked over by Socrates. But I realized right away that with Socrates around, our conversation would turn out to be not so much about your boys as about ourselves.”[9]
Indeed, in the dialogues we often see Socrates asking questions of young men, only to draw in their elders, as when he speaks to young Charmides in the dialogue named after him, only to engage the mature Critias (ch. 8*). Laches, who doesn’t know Socrates personally, assents to making Socrates the leader of the discussion, recognizing him as a man of good character and speech. Earlier, he gave a testimonial of Socrates the soldier: “He retreated with me in the flight from Delium, and I don’t mind saying that if the rest of our soldiers had acted like him, our city would have been safe and never suffered such a catastrophe.”[10]
With the attention of the four men and two boys, Socrates begins by pointing out that the proper place to start is with a definition of virtue, and specifically of courage. Socrates invites Laches to define courage. That’s easy, Laches replies, (1) “If a man will stand fast in the ranks and repel the enemy without fleeing, you can be sure he is courageous.”[11] But what about the Scythian cavalry, that use hit-and-run tactics, often fighting as they retreat? Well, that applies to the cavalry, Laches admits, but not the infantry. But, Socrates objects, what about the Spartan infantry, who broke their ranks pretending to flee at the battle of Plataea during the Persian War, and when the Persians broke ranks to pursue them, they formed up their lines again and crushed the Persians? They used a feigned retreat as a tactic to win a decisive victory against a superior foe.
While standing fast in battle may be an example of courage, it does not account for all cases. A definition should express what all cases of the virtue have in common. “It’s my fault you didn’t give a good answer, for I failed to make myself clear,” says Socrates. “I wanted you to consider not only those in the infantry who are courageous, but also those in the cavalry and in whatever military force, and not only those in war, but also those who are brave in dangers on sea, and those who are brave in facing diseases, poverty, and political threats; and moreover not only those who are courageous in facing pains and fears, but also those who are bold in confronting desires and pleasures, whether standing fast or turning tail to them—for presumably, Laches, there are those who show courage in these situations too.”[12] It is this insistence on securing a universal definition that marks Socrates as a philosopher rather than a moralizer or a casuist. As Aristotle said of Socrates, “he sought the universal in ethics and was the first to fix thought on definitions.”[13] The definition must be generally applicable to all genuine cases of courage; to give an instance of courage is not to define the virtue.
So Socrates asks anew for a definition of courage which will cover all the circumstances just mentioned. (2) “I think, then, that it is an endurance of soul, if I must characterize its nature in all circumstances.”[14] In other words, courage consists of persevering through dangers and hardships.
After a moment’s reflection, Socrates points out that courage must be something good, to which Laches agrees strongly. But then we must say that (2a) courage is endurance with wisdom or prudence. For foolish endurance is not virtuous. It would amount to stubbornness. Accordingly Socrates and Laches amend the definition to include a reference to wisdom. Now, however, Socrates points to examples in which a soldier, for instance, who is less skilled in combat acts more boldly than one who is skilled. In general, it seems to take more guts for the ignorant soldier to perform well in battle. It seems that the search for a definition has resulted in a contradiction.
Socrates rallies Laches: “If you will, let’s stand fast in our search and endure, that courage itself may not make fun of us, in case endurance itself should turn out to be courage.”[15] Courage, it seems, is needed even to carry out a philosophical investigation. At this point, Socrates invites Nicias to join them in their pursuit of a definition.
[6]. Plato Laches 181b; Nails 2002:312; on the characters of the dialogue, ibid., 180-81; 194; 198-99; 212-15.
[7].Plato Laches 184d-e.
[8].Plato Laches 187e-188a.
[9].Plato Laches 188b-c.
[10].Plato Laches 181b.
[11].Plato Laches 190e.
[12].Plato Laches 191c-e.
[13].Aristotle Metaphysics 987b2-4.
[14].Plato Laches 192b-c.
[15].Plato Laches 194a.