11.3 Oratory as a Craft

At this point Polus intervenes.  He is offended by Socrates’ refutation and eager to defend his master.  He challenges Socrates to say what art or craft (technē) he thinks oratory is. 

            “To be frank, it is no art at all, as it seems to me, Polus,” answers Socrates.

            “Well, what do you think oratory is?”

            … “I call it a routine (empeiria).” [5]

It is rare that Socrates offers theories of his own in Plato’s Socratic dialogues.  Now he offers a well-thought-out taxonomy contrasting a craft with a routine.  Socrates identifies two generic types of craft, one for the care of the body and one for the care of the soul; the former has no name (call it the physical art), the latter the social art.[6]  The physical art is subdivided into gymnastics—perhaps more colloquially the art of exercise—and medicine, the former for the building of the body, the latter for the repair of the body.  The social art is subdivided into legislation and justice, the former for the ordering of political life, the latter for the repair of breaches in that life.   These four activities are all crafts because they aim at what is best (to beltiston) for the body and soul, respectively, and they provide an account of the nature of the thing in question and identify the relevant cause.[7]  Medicine, for instance deals with health, the good state of the body, can define that state and identify its causes.

            By contrast there are four routines that imitate the corresponding arts, but instead of bringing about the best states of body and soul, seek to gratify them.  Rather than being crafts they are what Socrates calls them cases of flattery (kolakeia).  Cosmetics is to exercise as pastry-making (in modern parlance, a diet of junk food) is to medicine (a diet of health food); sophistry is to legislation as oratory is to justice.  The four routines in question provide the appearance of health of body and virtue of soul, but in fact they merely pander to the individual, offering indulgence instead of welfare.[8] 

            In fact, the Plato’s Socratic dialogues are full of what modern scholars call the Craft Analogy.[9]  The crafts are models of how knowledge can be put to use to make life better.  In a time of rapid technological progress (nothing like today’s high-tech industry, but impressive in its time), with arts like medicine, architecture, shipbuilding, and military science making great strides, offering what we would today call applied science.  Theoretical science is applied to solving practical problems and making a better life for everyone.  The value of knowledge is seen in its practical applications. 

            But what does oratory offer?  The ability to win arguments.  But if that winning arises from logical fallacies and verbal legerdemain, is it a real craft, or rather a pseudo-craft, a cheap conjuring trick?  Minimally, Socrates implies, our arguments must be grounded in truth and must aim at some bona fide good, not mere victory in debate.  No matter how dazzling the orator’s performance, Socrates wants the outcome to be responsible to truth and aiming at the good of the individual or society.  The orator should not merely win points but promote the good life.  Plato agrees, giving Socrates the opportunity to lay out in a positive way what has been a background assumption in his refutations.


[5].Plato Gorgias 462b-c.

[6].Plato Gorgias 464b-c. The word he uses for the art dealing with matters of soul is politikē (technē).

[7].Plato Gorgias 464c-465a.

[8].Plato Gorgias 464c-465d.

[9].See Irwin 1977: 71-114; Kube 1969; Parry 1996; Roochnik 1996.