Now come 29 pages of deductions without intermission. There is a logical order.
First we suppose that there is a One. We then prove that for a number of properties F, the One is not-F, and also not the contrary of F, in relation to itself and in relation to the Others.
Second, we suppose again that there is a One. We then prove that the One is F and also the contrary of F, in relation to itself and in relation to the Others.
Third, we suppose again that there is a One. We then prove that the Others are F and also the contrary of F, in relation to themselves and in relation to the One.
Fourth, we suppose again that there is a One. We then prove that the Others are not-F and also not the contrary of F, in relation to themselves and in relation to the One.
Fifth, we suppose that the One is not. We then prove that the One is both F and the contrary of F, in relation to itself and in relation to the Others.
Sixth, we suppose again that the One is not. We then prove that the One is not-F and not the contrary of F, in relation to itself and in relation to the Others.
Seventh, we suppose again that the One is not. We then prove that the Others are F and the contrary of F, in relation both to themselves and in relation to the One.
Eighth, we suppose again that the One is not. We then prove that the Others are not-F and not the contrary of F, in relation to the themselves and relation to the One.[18]
For instance, in the first deduction or exercise, we find that, on the hypothesis that there is a One, there is not a part nor a whole, for in that case there would be a Many, which the hypothesis precludes. Furthermore, the One would be unlimited, without shape, would exist nowhere, because it would not exist in another. It could not move or alter. It cannot be the same or different than itself or another thing. It could not be like or unlike anything. It could not exist in time. It could not be named or referred to in speech or thought.
In the second deduction, we find that, on the hypothesis that there is a One, since it is, there will be Being besides the One. Hence it will be a whole and parts, be limited and unlimited in number, would have shape and exist somewhere, move and be at rest, be the same and different, be like and unlike, exist in time, and be named and referred to.
The deductions come thick and fast, so there is no time for Aristotle the answerer or us the audience to carefully evaluate the claims, or even, at times, be sure what sorts of things the One and the Others are supposed to be. Paradoxes pile up quickly, apparently in the manner of those offered by Zeno in his book of refutations. We can, perhaps, discern the difference between an austere Monism in the first deduction, one which precludes discussion and knowledge, and a generous Monism in the second, where the One turns out to be a whole with Many, perhaps an infinite number, of parts, that can be named, described, and known.
Scholars have undertaken the Herculean task of analyzing the many arguments that make up the second half of the Parmenides, discovering many valid and sound arguments.[19] But the overall effect is, as perhaps it is designed to be, both exhausting and overwhelming. Plato departs from his usual practice of making the complex and abstract accessible to the non-expert reader. We, the readers, are left with the impression that, whatever is going on here, it is beyond our comprehension. What-is is both one and many, a whole comprised of parts and not a whole; having and lacking shape, existing and not existing somewhere, in time and not in time, changing and at rest, the same and not the same, different and not different, alike a unlike, not alike and not unlike, with and without a name, able and no able to be referred to and to be known.
What is Plato up to?
[18] See Rickless 2007: 95-111, esp. 109-10.
[19] Recently and notably in Rickless 2007.