11.4 Power and Happiness

As the debate between Socrates and Polus develops, Polus is shocked at Socrates’ contempt for orators and their alleged art.  “How can you say they are not respected,” he objects, “when they wield the greatest power in their cities?”

            “They do not, if by having power you mean something that is good for them.”[10]

            Now Socrates offers another set of considerations of his own to support his apparently bizarre claim that having great power is no guarantee of success or happiness.  He begins by distinguishing three values: good, bad, and neither good nor bad, anticipating the later Stoic trifecta of good, bad, and indifferent.  Which of them motivates human behavior?  Certainly we do not seek the bad.  And we do not choose what is neither bad nor good for its own sake, but only if and when we think it will lead us to something good.  I buy a car not because it is intrinsically good or bad but because it will help me get to work, help me with my errands, and so on. 

            Socrates makes this a principle of his moral psychology, an axiom of human motivation:

            “So in pursuit of the good (to agathon) we walk whenever we walk, supposing it to be better, or on the contrary we stand when we stand, for the sake of this, the good, don’t we? . . .

            “For the sake of the good, therefore, agents do whatever they do.”[11]

            Crucially, Socrates holds that we do whatever we do for the sake of the good, not for the sake of what we think is good.  So we had better figure out what really is good if we want to be happy.  According to Polus, the absolute ruler has the power to kill, and that is a good thing.  But Socrates disagrees.  The power to kill, at least to kill without justification, is a bad thing.  So bad, in fact, that it is better to suffer the injustice than to do it to another. 

            Here we meet an important principle of moral psychology.  What motivates humans to act?  According to the view expressed by Socrates, we all seek the good; our intellect identifies what is good, and we seek that.  This view is known as Intellectualism: the intellect (Latin intellectus) determines the will.  The opposing view, held by most modern thinkers and some ancient ones, holds that we want what we want, and the intellect identifies that desire as the good.  This view is known as Voluntarism: the will (Latin voluntas) determines the intellect.  On the former view, the mind is so constituted as to rule the passions; on the latter view, the passions rule the mind. 

            Now Socrates is not so naïve as to think that everyone is completely rational in his or her moral choices.  But he does hold that when someone makes a bad choice as to what goal to pursue, he or she is acting out of ignorance, not passion.  According to the voluntarist, unruly passions must be held in check by moderate passions.  But according to Socrates, “Moral weakness is nothing but ignorance (amathia), and self-control is nothing but wisdom (sophia).”[12] If you really know what is good for you, you will pursue that to the exclusion of everything else; if, however, you are confused, you will make bad choices, thinking they will lead you to the good.  In either case, the intellect governs the passions, not vice versa.

            Justice is something that is inherently good for a person.  So to act justly is good for you, and, if you do something bad, it is good for you to be corrected.  So, Socrates tells Polus, “Don’t shrink from answering, Polus.  It won’t hurt.  But kindly reply to the argument as you would respond to a doctor, and say yes or no to my questions.”[13]  Socrates’ method of examination is therapeutic, like a medical regime.  It can be embarrassing and even humiliating, but it removes damaging falsehoods from your soul and lets you see things as they are.  “Just as the art of finance saves you from poverty and the art of medicine saves you from disease, the art of justice,” Socrates promises, “will save you from misconduct and injustice.”[14]


[10].Plato Gorgias 466b.

[11].Plato Gorgias 467e-468b. Cf. SA ch. 28. 

[12].Plato Protagoras 358c.

[13].Plato Gorgias 475d-e.

[14].Plato Gorgias 478a-b.