By now Euthyphro is befuddled. His most promising definition of the holy has been revealed as inadequate. The holy may indeed be loved by all the gods, but that does not explain what it is or why the gods love it. At this point Socrates offers a hint. “See if you think that every holy thing must necessarily be just.” Euthyphro agrees. “Then is every just thing also holy? Or is every holy thing just, but not every just thing holy, but part of it holy and part something else?” Euthyphro is confused by this question. Socrates explains with examples that some collections are subsets of others, like odd numbers of integers. So which is the more inclusive set, holy things or just things? It would seem that some acts of justice are directed towards the gods, while others are directed to other persons, so the holy is “part” of the just.[23]
When he has grasped the whole-part, or really the genus-species, distinction, Euthyphro is able to offer another definition. “Well, this is what I think, Socrates: that part of the just which has to do with the service of gods is the pious and holy; that part which has to do with the service of men is the remainder.”[24] This seems promising. Justice is a virtue which has a subordinate class, holiness, dealing specifically with the service of the gods rather than, for instance, men. If justice is a virtue, so is holiness.
But Socrates wants to understand what Euthyphro means by ‘service.’ He turns to the Craft Analogy. We understand what it is to serve or look after horses, dogs, and cattle. There are people who have the appropriate skills of animal husbandry. These craftsmen make their charges better by their service. They aim to benefit the animals they work with.
“Now holiness, since it is service to the gods, does it offer to benefit the gods and make them better? And would you agree that when you do some pious act, you make some god better?”
“No, by Zeus,” answers Euthyphro. It seems blasphemous to make such a claim, for the gods are self-sufficient and need nothing from us.
Socrates did not think he meant that. “Well, then, what kind of service to the gods would holiness be?”
“The kind, Socrates, that slaves render to their masters.”
“I see. It would be some kind of waiting on the gods.”
“Of course.”
Socrates returns to the Craft Analogy. A servant attending a doctor would help to produce health; a servant attending a shipbuilder would help build ships; a servant attending a builder would help build houses.
“Tell me, my good man, what purpose would waiting on the gods accomplish? Obviously you know, since you claim to be a leading expert on divinity.”
“And rightly so.”
“So tell me, by Zeus, just what is that wonderful end which the gods accomplish with our help.”
“Many fine things, Socrates.”
Euthyphro is stalling. Just what do the gods need our help to accomplish?
“To put it simply, if a man knows how to say things pleasing to the gods, and to offer proper prayers and sacrifices, these actions are holy, and they protect his own household and the welfare of his city.”
“You could have given me the answer to my question in a few words, had you wished, Euthyphro,” replies Socrates. “But you are not interested in instructing me, it is clear. For when you were about to give me the answer, you turned away. If you had answered, I would have discovered the secret of holiness from you. But as it is, the questioner must follow the answerer wherever he leads.”[25]
So, Socrates asks, service is a knowledge of sacrifice and prayer, according to you? And to sacrifice is to give gifts to the gods and to pray is to ask for favors? Accordingly, it is a knowledge of giving and asking. It should involve knowing what the gods need from us and how to ask for what we need from them. “So the art of holiness, Euthyrphro, would be a kind of art of commerce between gods and men.”
“Yes, commerce, if you want to call it that.”
This answer captures a good deal of popular religion in Greece and later Rome. If you want success in some project, promise some god a pleasing sacrifice as a reward for helping you. Find out what the god wants and give it to him so that you can get what you want. As for moral behavior and living a righteous life, that is all irrelevant. Religion is just a negotiation between clients and patrons, the former weak and needy, the latter powerful and venal. Socrates thinks the present definition is outrageous. But Euthyphro is oblivious.
We still don’t know, Socrates continues, what the gods need from us. How can we benefit them? They surely can give all good things to us, but what can we give them in return?
“Do you really think, Socrates, that the gods benefit from what they get from us?”
“But then what could these gifts be, Euthyphro, that we give to the gods?”
“What else do you think, but honor, veneration, and what I just mentioned, gratitude?”
“So the holy, Euthyphro, is what gratifies the gods, but not what is beneficial or pleasing to them?
“I think it is the most pleasing thing of all.”
“This, then, is what holiness is, what is pleasing to the gods.”
“Indeed.”
Socrates points out that Euthyphro has now gone back to the definition he had abandoned earlier, arguing in a big circle. Behind the criticism is a verbal joke, for the name ‘Euthy-phro’ means ‘straight-thinker.’
Socrates invites Euthyphro to start over again and try to say what holiness is. But the seer suddenly remembers a previous engagement and begs off.
“What are you doing, my friend? You are leaving me bereft of the great hope I had, that from you I would learn what the holy is and thus escape the accusation of Meletus. I would have proved to him that I had become wise by studying divinity with Euthyphro and showed him that I would no longer make stupid statements or propose radical ideas about the gods, but live forever after a changed man.”[26]
The nature of piety is critical to Socrates and promises to be the central issue of his trial. What, according to Socrates, is piety? He has hinted that Euthyphro came close to a definition but made a wrong turn. Socrates clearly has some religious views, including some revisionary ones. He doesn’t approve of the myths that portray the gods as fighting among themselves and going to war with each other. He seems to agree with Euthyphro that the gods do not need anything from us that would benefit them or make them better. The holy is no doubt pleasing to the gods, but there must be some rational basis for this fact that so far remains inscrutable. Holiness may have something to do with justice, as Socrates hinted to Euthyphro. In particular, it may have to do with humans’ behavior toward the gods. But precisely what?
Socrates’ interview with Euthyphro constitutes another chapter in his ongoing examination of self-proclaimed experts. They lack a fundamental understanding of the subject they claim as their area of expertise. Does Socrates know what they don’t, or does he simply know that he doesn’t know?
[23]. Plato Euthyphro 11b-12e.
[24]. Plato Euthyphro 12e.
[25]. Plato Euthyphro 13a-14c.
[26]. Plato Euthyphro 14c-16a.