With Athens in disarray, the city-states of Ionia, long under the dominion of Athens and the Delian League, sent envoys to Sparta secretly, offering to revolt if Sparta could defend them. Here was the escape Alcibiades needed. He got himself posted to Ionia, across the Aegean Sea from King Agis. He opened negotiations with the Persian satrap (provincial governor) Tissaphernes. As a result of the victories of the Delian League in the early fifth century, the Persians had been driven from the Aegean. By the Peace of Callias long ago in 449, the Persians had agreed to stay out of the Aegean in return for the Greeks’ ceasing to raid Persian territory. Now, however, the two Greek states who had defeated Persia in the Persian War were destroying each other, and the Asian empire was in a position to exploit their mutual enmity, with Alcibiades telling them how to discomfit the Athenians.
Supported by Persian money, the Spartans now built their own fleet to augment the navy supplied by Corinth, and ships from the victorious Syracuse joined the cause. After a series of revolts and battles in Ionia in 412, islands such as Chios and Rhodes went over to the Spartan side. The island Samos became the headquarters of the Athenian fleet, while Miletus on the mainland became the headquarters of the Spartan fleet. The Spartan government sent secret orders to Astyochus, the Spartan commander, to put Alcibiades to death, apparently as payback from King Agis.[48] Alcibiades got wind of the orders and moved to the court of Tissaphernes in Magnesia, ostensibly to carry on negotiations with Persians more directly. But now knowing that he had no future with the Spartans, he set about burning his bridges. He advised Tissaphernes to hold back payments to the Spartans and their allies so as to keep both sides weak and the Spartans dependent. Tissaphernes instantly admired Alcibiades for “being wily and extremely devious, since [the satrap] was not honest himself, but malicious and reprobate,” says Plutarch. His term ‘wily’ polytropos, is the same one Homer uses of Odysseus.[49] In Alcibiades Tissaphernes found a man after his own heart, and named his favorite park after his double-dealing friend.[50] Alcibiades proceeded to open a correspondence with the aristocratic Athenian commanders at Samos, indicating that he had influence with Tissaphernes, and hinting that if a more moderate government were installed in Athens, he would be willing to switch sides and bring Persian resources with him.[51]
The aristocratic Athenian commanders in Samos began plotting to make changes in Athens and bring Alcibiades back—all but Phrynichus, who distrusted Alcibiades. Phrynicus sent a letter to Astyochus the Spartan commander betraying Alcibiades’ plan to switch sides. But instead of revealing the plot, Astyochus went up to Magnesia himself and told Tissaphernes and Alcibiades of Phrynichus’ warning to himself—apparently more interested in ingratiating himself with Tissaphernes than in defeating the Athenians. Alcibiades then sent a letter to the other commanders at Samos exposing Phrynichus as a traitor. When Phrynichus found out that he had been exposed, he wrote a second letter to Astyochus offering to betray the force at Samos to the Spartans. This time he expected Astyochus to inform on him, so he told the authorities on Samos that he had secret information of an imminent attack, and that the army on Samos needed to fortify its camp. When a letter came from Alcibiades informing them of an imminent attack planned by Phrynichus, the latter discredited the former.[52] Suddenly everyone was double-crossing everyone.
Now a movement began at Samos to change the government in Athens. Peisander, one of the military leaders, argued that the only way to save Athens was to establish a more moderate, that is, more oligarchical (and Sparta-like) government. Coming to Athens, he spoke in the Assembly about the need to make fundamental changes in the government, to negotiate with Alcibiades, and gain Persian support. The enemies of Alcibiades spoke up against any reconciliation, but Peisander made it clear that the nay-sayers had no constructive policy to rescue Athens from their desperate situation, whereas Peisander did. The Assembly finally authorized Peisander and ten other envoys to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. Peisander also got the traitorous general Phrynichus removed. Then he visited the men’s clubs in Athens and secretly encouraged them to subvert the democracy.[53]
Arriving at Magnesia in early 411, Peisander urged Alcibiades to turn Persian support from the Spartans to the Athenians. But Tissaphernes made extreme demands: the Athenians must surrender Ionia and the islands offshore to Persia, as well as allow the Persian navy to operate along the coast. In effect the Athenians would have to give up all their gains from the Delian League, as well as their overseas empire. At this point it became clear that, whatever his pretensions, Alcibiades had no real influence over Persian policy. Peisander sailed to Samos empty-handed, but he and his colleagues kept their diplomatic failure secret, for only the hope of foreign assistance could justify their plot to overthrow the Athenian government.[54]
Peisander set up an oligarchical government in Samos, then sailed to other subject cities and installed oligarchies. In Athens he and his colleagues, by assassination, intimidation, and finally a coup on the 14th of Thargelion, in June of 411, took over the government.[55] They installed an oligarchy known as the Four Hundred to replace the democracy. They promised to establish an assembly of Five Thousand, limited to members of the middle class and higher. But they never got around to broadening the citizenship. One of the oligarchs was Phrynichus, who refused to consider recalling his enemy Alcibiades.[56] The oligarchs immediately made overtures of peace to King Agis, who was at the fortress of Decelea. But he, thinking that Athens was in confusion, marched an army up to the walls of Athens. The Athenians, however, did not surrender, but shot down some of his troops.[57] The oligarchs evidently wanted to end the war quickly, but they were not firmly enough in control to bring about a cessation of hostilities.
As usual, Socrates stayed out of politics. But he was not shy about pointing out the problems of democracy, which had been on display since the resumption of hostilities after the Peace of Nicias. Aristophanes identifies him with a movement of young men who were “mad about Sparta” and “Socratized” by going hungry and unbathed.[58] Although Socrates admired Spartan self-control and recognized the weaknesses of a regime in which inexperienced assemblymen acted impulsively on important matters, it is not clear that he saw oligarchy as a solution. As we shall see, he upheld a rule by law that Athenian democracy often fell short of, and resisted a later oligarchical regime (chs. 19, 20, 21, 26*). Inevitably, however, his name did become associated with anti-democratic factions.
[48].Thucydides 8.45.1.
[49].Plutarch Alcibiades 24.4; on the term, see Ellis 1989, 124 n. 9.
[50].Plutarch Alcibiades 24.5.
[51].Thucydides 8.47; Plutarch Alcibiades 25.1-4.
[52].Thucydides 8.50-51.
[53].Thucydides 8.51-53-54.
[54].Thucydides 8.56. Thucydides makes it sound like Alcibiades purposely stalled the Athenians, but it hardly seems likely that this would benefit them. Rather, Tissaphernes humiliated Alcibiades by offering no concessions to his Athenian friends.
[55].Aristotle Constitution of Athens 32.1. See Kagan 1987: 157 and n. 100.
[56].Thucydides 8.67-70.
[57].Thucydides 8.70.2-8.71.
[58].Aristophanes Birds 1281-1282, making up the word sōkrateō. The play was performed in 414 BC.